

Message Text

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ACTION ARA-06

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 SP-02 INR-05 CIAE-00 NSC-05

NSCE-00 EB-03 DODE-00 PRS-01 PM-03 H-01 AF-04 IO-03

EUR-08 EA-06 TRSE-00 /062 W
----- 102220

R 221330Z JAN 76

FM AMEMBASSY KINGSTON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9971

INFO AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN

HGEMBASSY CARACAS 295

AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN

AMEMBASSY NASSAU

AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE

AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN

AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 KINGSTON 0310

LIMDIS

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROGERS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, JM

SUBJECT: JAMAICAN PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S.

REF: STATE 10605

1. SUMMARY. IDEOLOGICAL INCLINATIONS AND DIRECTIONS OF THE
MANLEY GOVERNMENT ASSURE AN INCREASING DEGREE OF PERVERSITY
IN JAMAICA'S ACTIONS IN AREAS OF INTEREST TO US. INCLINATIONS
IN THIS DIRECTION ARE REINFORCED BY MANLEY GOVERNMENT'S PER-
CEPTIONS OF OUR WEAKNESSES AND THEREFORE OUR ABILITY TO
EFFECTIVELY PROTECT OUR INTERESTS. ON THE OTHER HAND,
JAMAICA'S ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE AND OTHER LINKS TO THE U.S.
ARE SO BASIC THAT WE ARE NOT LIKELY FOR THE FORESEEABLE
FUTURE TO LOSE ACCESS TO THE ONE THING THAT COUNTS IN THIS

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COUNTRY: BAUXITE. END SUMMARY.

2. OTHER MESSAGES ALREADY SENT AND A POLITICAL TRENDS ANALYSIS CURRENTLY UNDER PREPARATION RESPOND EITHER DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY TO SOME OF THE QUESTIONS YOU POSE IN REFTEL. MANY ALSO ARE MORE RELEVANT TO LATIN AMERICA THAN TO THE CARIBBEAN-- AND ESPECIALLY TO THOSE GOVERNMENTS WITH WHICH WE HAVE A CLOSE SECURITY RELATIONSHIP. NONETHELESS, WE APPRECIATE PURPOSE OF MESSAGE AND HOPE OUR RESPONSES TO EACH OF THE SPECIFIC QUESTIONS WILL BE HELPFUL IN YOUR CURRENT STUDY. OUR ANSWERS ARE KEYED TO LETTERED QUESTIONS IN REFTEL, AND ARE CONCURRED IN BY KEY MEMBERS COUNTRY TEAM.

(A) AS BACKGROUND IT IS IMPORTANT TO UNDERSTAND JAMAICA'S PROXIMITY TO U.S., FREQUENT TRAVEL BY JAMAICANS TO AND FROM U.S., AND USE OF ENGLISH LANGUAGE HERE ASSURE ALL ASPECTS OF VIETNAM WAR, WATERGATE, CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION OF CIA, ETC. HAVE BEEN THOROUGHLY Aired IN JAMAICA BY ALL MEDIA. NEWSPAPERS, FOR EXAMPLE, HAVE REGULARLY LIFTED STORIES ON THESE SUBJECTS FROM TIME, NEWSWEEK, NEW YORK TIMES, MIAMI HERALD, ETC. END RESULT IS MANY JAMAICANS-- PARTICULARLY THE SOPHISTICATED--PERCEIVE OUR STRENGTHS AND VULNERABILITIES IN MUCH THE SAME MANNER AS DO MANY (IF NOT MOST) AMERICANS. IN PARTICULAR, MANY (INCLUDING SOME OF OUR FRIENDS HERE) ARE INCLINED TO BELIEVE THE WORST IN RESPECT TO THE CIA--ESPECIALLY SINCE JAMAICAN PRESS HAS TENDED TO FOCUS ON MORE SENSATIONAL ASPECTS OF CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS AND ON SOME OF MORE LUDICROUS "PLOTS." THOSE WHO ARE NOT SO FRIENDLY AFFIRM PAST YEAR'S CIA PUBLICITY PROVIDES PROOF POSITIVE OF CIA COMPLICITY IN JAMAICA'S INTERNAL PROBLEMS. THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS THUS HAVE SEEN AN ESCALATING CAMPAIGN AGAINST ALLEGED CIA INVOLVEMENT IN JAMAICA. CAMPAIGN INCLUDES GRAFFITI ("CIA OUT," "SEAGA IS A CIA AGENT") ON LITERALLY HUNDREDS OF WALLS THROUGHOUT KINGSTON. MORE SERIOUSLY, IT INCLUDES PUBLIC ALLEGATIONS BY THE RADICAL LEFT OF PM MANLEY'S GOVERNMENT AND PARTY (ESPECIALLY THE PNP YOUTH) OF CIA INTERFERENCE IN JAMAICAN POLITICS. ALL OF THIS IS HAVING ITS IMPACT ON THOSE WHO MIGHT OTHERWISE BE SKEPTICAL, WHILE ALSO FUELING THE POLARIZATION OF THE JAMAICAN POLITICAL

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SCENE. MORE TO THE POINT (WITH RESPECT TO YOUR QUESTION), IS THAT THE COMBINATION OF WATERGATE, VIETNAM, THE CIA HEARINGS, OUR RELATIVE INEFFECTIVENESS IN ANGOLA, AND THE IMPACT OF U.S. PRESS COVERAGE OF THESE EVENTS, HAVE ESTABLISHED HERE THE IMPRESSION OF A RATHER BUMBLING AND INEFFECTIVE GIANT INCAPABLE OF ENFORCING ITS WILL--EVEN IN THOSE AREAS OF PRIMARY CONCERN AND INTEREST TO IT. THIS IS OFFSET TO SOME DEGREE BY ADMIRATION OF THE DEMOCRATIC

PROCESSES WHICH ALLOWED FOR A WATERGATE CLEANUP, AND RELIEF THAT THE U.S. FINALLY EXTRACTED ITSELF FROM VIETNAM.

(B) EXCEPT AMONG THE MOST CONSERVATIVE ELEMENTS OF JAMAICAN SOCIETY, THERE WAS NEVER MUCH SYMPATHY TOWARD OR UNDERSTANDING OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM. U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM VIETNAM WAS THEREFORE WELCOMED, AND SECRETARY KISSINGER IS ADMIRER BY MANY FOR THE MANNER IN WHICH HE TERMINATED U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN THAT WAR. IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY SIGNIFICANT BILATERAL SECURITY RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN JAMAICA AND THE U.S., AND OF ANY PERCEIVED EXTERNAL MILITARY THREAT, WE DOUBT THAT THERE WAS OR IS ANY SIGNIFICANT SPECIFIC CONCERN REGARDING THE ABILITY AND WILLINGNESS OF THE U.S. TO LIVE UP TO INTERNATIONAL SECURITY COMMITMENTS.

(C) JAMAICA'S ELITE AND THE GOJ ARE VERY AWARE OF EXISTING PROBLEMS BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH AND THE CONGRESS, AND OF IMPLICATIONS THAT FLOW FROM THOSE DIFFERENCES. IN PARTICULAR, GOJ IS PROBABLY DOUBTFUL RE THE WILLINGNESS OF THE CONGRESS TO FOLLOW THE PRESIDENT'S AND THE SECRETARY'S LEAD WITH RESPECT TO AID COMMITMENTS, THE PANAMA CANAL NEGOTIATIONS, THE LAW OF THE SEA, OAS REFORM, ETC. ON THE OTHER HAND, JAMAICA'S "READINESS TO COOPERATE WITH AND DEPEND ON THE U.S." RELATES LESS (UNDER THE MANLEY GOVERNMENT) TO THE ABOVE PERCEPTIONS AND CONCERNS THAN IT DOES TO THE IDEOLOGICAL BENT OF THE PRIME MINISTER AND HIS MORE RADICAL ASSOCIATES. THE SIGNIFICANCE FOR JAMAICANS OF U.S. EXECUTIVE/LEGISLATIVE DIFFERENCES IN FACT MAY RELATE MORE DIRECTLY TO THE GROWING CONVICTION AMONG MODERATE MEMBERS OF GOJ (AND AMONG THE OPPOSITION) THAT U.S. IS UNABLE OR UNWILLING IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES TO TAKE
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THOSE ACTIONS WHICH MIGHT HELP TO CHANGE PRESENT TRENDS HERE, E.G. HELP IN OBTAINING CREDITS OR OTHER ASSISTANCE WHICH COULD HELP STABILIZE OR EVEN IMPROVE ECONOMIC OUTLOOK, AND THUS HELP HALT THE DRIFT TO THE LEFT. THIS ASSUMES DRIFT TO LEFT IS LARGELY A CONSEQUENCE OF ECONOMIC PHENOMENA WHICH CAN BE RECTIFIED BY FULL EMPLOYMENT, ETC.-- PERHAPS A DOUBTFUL PROPOSITION. NONETHELESS, ABOVE SITUATION CONTRIBUTES TO DESPAIR AMONG MODERATES, THE CURRENT FLIGHT OF CAPITAL AND JAMAICANS TO U.S. AND CANADA, AND THUS TO A SITUATION IN WHICH COUNTRY MAY GO TO THE RADICALS BY DEFAULT.

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INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 SP-02 INR-05 CIAE-00 NSC-05

NSCE-00 EB-03 DODE-00 PRS-01 PM-02 H-01 AF-04 IO-03

EUR-08 EA-06 TRSE-00 /061 W

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R 221330Z JAN 76

FM AMEMBASSY KINGSTON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9972

INFO AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN

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AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN

AMEMBASSY NASSAU

AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE

AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN

AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO

S E C R E T FINAL SECTION OF 2 KINGSTON 0310

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FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROGERS

(D) GOJ UNDERSTANDS ORGANIZATIONAL CHART ASPECTS OF U.S. POLITICAL PROCESSES AND ROLE OF THE U.S. CONGRESS, BUT NOT NECESSARILY THE DYNAMICS. AS IN MANY OTHER CAPITALS WHERE AN "EASY FIX" IS POSSIBLE, THERE IS AN ASSUMPTION AMONG MANY KEY JAMAICANS THAT ANYTHING CAN BE DONE IN WASHINGTON IF YOU CAN GET TO AND PUSH THE RIGHT BUTTON. THE CONFLICTING MAZE OF PERSONALITIES, BUREAUCRATIC INTERESTS, LEGISLATIVE/EXECUTIVE JEALOUSIES, AND LEGAL OR REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS IS SIMPLY NOT FULLY COMPREHENDED OR APPRECIATED. THE PROBLEM IS COMPOUNDED PERHAPS BY THE FACT THAT JAMAICA'S LEADERS, WHATEVER THEIR POLITICAL COLORATION, THINK THEY UNDERSTAND THESE PROCESSES AND ACT ACCORDINGLY. MISUNDERSTANDINGS AND UNPLEASANTNESS THUS CAN ARISE WHEN JAMAICAN REQUESTS ARE NOT PROMPTLY AND FULLY ACTED UPON. DESPITE YOUR OWN STRENUOUS

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EFFORTS AND OBVIOUS CONCERN, THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT FONMIN DUDLEY THOMPSON, PRIME MINISTER MANLEY, AND OTHERS BELIEVE LATIN AMERICA AND CARIBBEAN ARE RELATIVELY LOW IN AMERICAN PRIORITIES--WITH THE OBVIOUS EXCEPTION OF SUCH HIGH-PROFILE PROBLEM AREAS AS THE PANAMA CANAL.

(E) THERE ARE DEFINITELY CHANGES IN TRADITIONAL ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE U.S. INsofar AS THE GOJ IS CONCERNED. PM MANLEY'S LOVE AFFAIR WITH CASTRO, HIS ASPIRATIONS FOR THIRD WORLD LEADERSHIP, AND HIS OWN IDEOLOGICAL INCLINATIONS SEEM TO ASSURE A CONTINUING DRIFT IN FOREIGN POLICY TO THE LEFT, AND THUS AN INCREASING RANGE OF FRICTION POINTS IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIPS. ON THE OTHER HAND, DESPITE EFFORTS TO DIVERSIFY JAMAICA'S BAUXITE/ALUMINA MARKET, JAMAICA WILL REMAIN DEPENDENT ON THE U.S. MARKET FOR SOME YEARS TO COME. THIS, TOGETHER WITH THE IMPORTANCE OF THE TOURIST INDUSTRY AND GEOGRAPHIC PROXIMITY, WOULD SEEM TO ASSURE THAT--WHATEVER MAY HAPPEN IN THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS REALM--THERE WILL BE CLOSE ECONOMIC TIES FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE.

(F) MANLEY AND MANY OTHER KEY JAMAICAN LEADERS ARE EMOTIONAL TO THE POINT OF IRRATIONALITY ON THE SUBJECT OF SOUTH AFRICA. SOUTH AFRICA'S INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA, COUPLED WITH MANLEY'S LOVE AFFAIR WITH CUBA, THUS ASSURED SYMPATHY FOR CUBA'S INVOLVEMENT. THE REMARKABLE THING IS THAT THE GOJ HAS THUS FAR WITHHELD RECOGNITION OF THE MPLA. WE CAN ONLY ASSUME THIS IS OUT OF DEFERENCE TO THE OAU (NOT THE U.S.) AND THAT JAMAICA WILL FOLLOW THE LEAD OF THE MAJORITY IN THAT ORGANIZATION. PUT ANOTHER WAY, THE ANGOLAN ISSUE HAS BECOME CONFUSED BY WHAT IS SEEN BY MANY HERE AS A HOLY WAR AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA; RECOGNITION OF THE MPLA IS REALLY A QUESTION OF WHEN, NOT WHETHER.

(G) ALTHOUGH DUDLEY THOMPSON UNDOUBTEDLY ENJOYS THE FUN AND GAMES (AND THE OPPORTUNITY TO BAIT THE U.S.) PROVIDED BY SUCH ORGANIZATIONS AS THE OAS AND SELA--NOT TO MENTION THE UN--THE JAMAICANS CAN BE PRAGMATIC. ON ALL MAJOR ISSUES OF IMPORTANCE TO JAMAICA, THEY WILL WISH TO DEAL WITH US ON A BILATERAL BASIS. THOMPSON IS IN FACT SKEPTICAL ABOUT THE VALUE OF THE OAS IN ITS
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PRESENT FORM, AND A FAIRLY ENTHUSIASTIC SUPPORTER OF OUR OWN VIEWS ON OAS REFORM.

(H) JAMAICA'S VOTING PATTERN IN THE U.N. AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IS INFLUENCED IN PART BY

ITS OWN THIRD WORLD STANCE BUT ALSO BY AN ASSUMPTION THAT THE TIGER IS TO SOME DEGREE WITHOUT EFFECTIVE TEETH. RECENT EFFORTS BY THE USG TO LINK THE CHARACTER OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIPS TO VOTING IN THE UN ON KEY ISSUES WERE PROBABLY SEEN AS LARGELY BOMBASTIC AND ESSENTIALLY EMPTY THREATS. THIS VIEW MAY BE REINFORCED BY THE ABSENCE THUS FAR OF ANY READILY PERCEIVABLE FOLLOW-THROUGH ANYWHERE.

(I) JAMAICA'S ECONOMIC POSITION IS DESPERATE AND THE GOJ HAS JUST ABOUT EXHAUSTED ITS ABILITY TO OBTAIN SHORT OR LONG TERM MONEY THROUGH TRADITIONAL SOURCES. IT PROBABLY HAS LITTLE FAITH IN ITS ABILITY TO GET THE U.S. TO ACT QUICKLY ON ITS REQUEST FOR HELP IN OBTAINING CREDIT ASSISTANCE. IT THUS HAS FELT IT HAS LITTLE ALTERNATIVE BUT TO EXPLORE OTHER SOURCES, INCLUDING THE SOVIET BLOC--AS IT HAS BEEN DOING. THE QUESTIONS ARE, OF COURSE, THE DEGREE TO WHICH SOVIETS OR THEIR SURROGATES ARE PREPARED TO BE RESPONSIVE, AND WHAT THE POLITICAL PRICE TAG MIGHT BE. ON THE OTHER HAND, WE SEE NO REASON TO BELIEVE NEW POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC LINKS WITH THE SOVIET BLOC MUST NECESSARILY AND SERIOUSLY AFFECT U.S. ACCESS TO JAMAICA'S BAUXITE. THE JAMAICANS WOULD LIKE TO SELL MORE, NOT LESS, TO US. ON OTHER HAND, ANY SIGNIFICANT SOVIET BLOC ASSISTANCE MIGHT CUT INTO THE U.S. MARKET IN JAMAICA--IF SUCH ASSISTANCE IS IN THE FORM OF EXPORT CREDITS.

(J) PRIME MINISTER MANLEY, FOREIGN MINISTER THOMPSON AND THE GOJ IN GENERAL EXPRESSED LUKEWARM ENTHUSIASM FOR THE U.S. INITIATIVES DURING THIS PAST SEPTEMBER'S UNGA SPECIAL SESSION. TO THE EXTENT THEY HAVE DOUBTS, THE LATTER RELATE TO THE ABILITY AND WILL OF THE U.S. TO FOLLOW UP (ESPECIALLY GIVEN U.S. CONGRESSIONAL PROBLEMS) AND TO THE APPLICABILITY OF THESE INITIATIVES TO NATIONS SUCH AS JAMAICA. BEYOND THESE CONSIDERATIONS, JAMAICA'S COMMITMENT TO THE THIRD WORLD, ITS IDEOLOGICAL AVERSION TO THE MULTINATIONALS, AND ITS COMMITMENT TO THE NIEO
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ALL ASSURE A RATHER SKEPTICAL ATTITUDE AS TO GOOD FAITH AND INTENTIONS OF NOT ONLY THE U.S. BUT ALSO OF WESTERN EUROPE AND JAPAN.
GERARD

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: FOREIGN RELATIONS, POLICIES, PUBLIC ATTITUDES, POLITICAL SUMMARIES
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 22 JAN 1976
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: coburnhl
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1976KINGST00310
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D760024-0877
From: KINGSTON
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1976/newtext/t19760132/aaaabbxd.tel
Line Count: 323
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION ARA
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: LIMDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 6
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: LIMDIS
Reference: 76 STATE 10605
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: coburnhl
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 11 FEB 2004
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <11 FEB 2004 by GarlanWA>; APPROVED <20 OCT 2004 by coburnhl>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
04 MAY 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: JAMAICAN PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S.
TAGS: PFOR, JM, US
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006